

سند/ رصد دقیق تحولات ایران توسط امریکا

۱۳ شهریور ۱۴۰۰ ساعت ۱۶:۱۵

دولت قوام برای غلبه بر بحران آذربایجان سیاست گفتگوی صبورانه را در پیش گرفت و سعی کرد با پیشه‌آوری و سایر مقامات فرقه دموکرات آذربایجان در تهران و تبریز مذاکره کند.

در این سند (متن صفحه ای از کتاب روابط خارجی امریکا، خاورمیانه و آفریقا، جلد ۷) درباره اقدام [قوام السلطنه](#) به مذاکره با پیشه‌وری و اصرار شاه به اعزام ۳ تیپ از ارتش برای مقابله با پیشه‌وری، مشاهده می‌شود.

«دولت قوام برای غلبه بر بحران آذربایجان سیاست گفتگوی صبورانه را در پیش گرفت و سعی کرد با پیشه‌آوری و سایر مقامات فرقه دموکرات آذربایجان در تهران و تبریز مذاکره کند. یکی از اقدامات قوام برای حل بحران آذربایجان، مذاکره با میرجعفر پیشه‌وری بود. از این رو روز ۸ اردیبهشت ۱۳۲۵ هیئتی از آذربایجان به ریاست پیشه‌وری وارد تهران شد و به مدت دو هفته با مقامات دولتی به مذاکره پرداختند.»



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1946, Volume VII The Near East and Africa
IRAN

Pages 453-454

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

Tehran, May 8, 1946 - 6 a.m.
(Received May 9 - 8:17 a.m.)

659. From Allen.

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The Prime Minister (Qavam) then told me in the utmost confidence that his difficulties were not so much with Pishvari as with the Shah. He said that he felt confident he could make arrangements with Pishvari and that they had actually come fairly close to an agreement, on the basis of the appointment by Tehran (1) of a governor general in Tabriz, and (2) of an officer from the Iranian Army to take command of the Azerbaijan forces, the latter to be selected by the Tehran Government from among five officers of the Iranian Army to be dominated (nominated?) by Pishvari. There still remained some difference over the question of finances, Pishvari insisting upon appointing the Director General of Finances of Azerbaijan, but Qavam thought this could be arranged. Qavam said that the Shah objected to the proposed arrangement, and insisted upon sending three brigades of the Iranian Army (5,000 or 6,000 men) into Azerbaijan immediately, one to be station in Tabriz, one at Rezaieh, and one at Ardabil. Qavam was convinced that this action would result in fiasco, since dissatisfied elements in army and elements friendly towards Azerbaijan regime would probably go over to other side. In view of size of Azerbaijan forces (alleged to be 30,000), Qavam was afraid central forces would be defeated. He was convinced that best method of handling situation was to win Azerbaijan back to Tehran / control by pacific penetration. The Shah, on other hand, insists upon forceful occupation of the area.

Qavam said that his primary difficulty with the Shah resulted from the Shah's insistence upon exercising, in practice, his nominal position as Commander-in-Chief of Army. Qavam hoped very much that I would give the Shah good advice on the occasion of my forthcoming visit to him.

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